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An impossibility theorem is proved for electoral systems that has something of the flavour of 
Arrow's General Possibility Theorem [1], but is logically unrelated to it. The implications for 
the Single Transferable Vote are discussed. 
Suppose that n candidates take part in an election, and that each voter lists the 
names of some or all of the candidates in order of preference in his ballot (the 
first-preference andidate being the one whom that voter would most like to be 
elected, and so on). We should like to have a general method that will select m of 
the n candidates to be the ones elected, which will work for any values of m and n 
and any set of corresponding ballots. (The Single Transferable Vote [3, 4, 5] 
provides one such method.) 
Here are some of the properties that we should like such a method to have. 
(1) Increased support, for a candidate who would otherwise have been elected, 
should not prevent his election. (In particular, if some ballots that do not have X 
as first-preference andidate in one election are changed in a second election so as 
to have X as first-preference candidate with no second choice, while all other 
ballots remain unchanged, and if X is (among those) elected in the first election, 
then X should be elected in the second election as well.) 
(2a) Later preferences should not count against earlier preferences. 
(2b) Later preferences hould not count towards earlier preferences. (In 
particular, if the only difference between the ballots in two different elections is 
that some ballots that were marked only for X in the first election have second 
preferences added to them in the second election, then X should be elected in the 
second election if (2a), and only if (2b), X is elected in the first election.) 
(3) If no second preferences are expressed, and there is a candidate who has 
more first-preference votes than any other candidate, then that candidate should 
be elected. 
(4) If the number of ballots marked X first Y second, plus the number marked 
Y first X second, is more than half the total number of ballots, then at least one 
of X and Y should be elected. 
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Theorem. Properties (1)-(4) are mutually incompatible. 
Proof. If there is a method that works for all values of m and n, then in 
particular it will work when there are three candidates of whom one is to be 
elected. We shall consider some of the 20 elections represented in Table 1. 
Table 1 
oc 13 y fl' P Q R Q' P' 
A AB AB A 20 20 16 16 19 
B B BA BA 19 17 17 20 20 
C C C C 19 21 25 22 19 
We are particularly interested in the election yR, in which 16 ballots are 
marked A first B second, 17 are marked B first A second, and 25 are marked for 
C only. We shall use the symbol '---~' to mean 'results in the election of', and so 
Property 4 requires that yR-*A  or yR---~B. The following sequence of 
deductions yields a contradiction: 
trP.--.~ A, 
oca c, 
#P A, 
flQ--> C, 
#R C, 
yR÷B, 
by Property (3). 
by Property (3). 
by Property (2a), since trP ~ A. 
since flQ ~ A with t~Q--~ A would violate Property (2b), and 
flQ ~ B with flP--~ B would violate Property (1). 
by Property (1), since flQ ~ C. 
by Property (2b), since flR--~ B. 
In an exactly analogous way we can prove that yR--~A; for completeness, we set 
out the details: 
trP'..-, B, 
oca' c, 
fl' P' "* B, 
#'Q'--, c, 
fl ' R ---> C , 
yR -~ A, 
Thus we have proved 
(4). [] 
by Property (3). 
by Property (3). 
by Property (2a), since a~P'---~ B.
since fl'Q'-..~A with fl'P'--~A would violate Property (1), 
and 13'Q' ~ B with trQ'--~ B would violate Property (2b). 
by Property (1), since fl'Q'---~ C. 
by Property (2b), since fl'R--~ A. 
that yR--~A and yR--~ B, and this violates Property 
The Single Transferable Vote (STV), with the usual rule for exclusions (that, at 
each stage, the candidate who .is currently receiving fewest votes is excluded), 
possesses Properties (2a)and (2b), since a later preference on a ballot is never 
considered until the fates of all candidates of previous preference have been 
An impossibility theorem for electoral systems 211 
decided. This is an important feature of STV. If Property (2a) were violated (and 
this became generally known), then voters would be discouraged from expressing 
later preferences because this would reduce the chance of their first-preference 
candidate being elected. And if Property (2b) were violated, then voters would be 
encouraged to express later preferences that they did not feel, in order to increase 
the chance of their first-preference candidate being elected. These distortions in 
the pattern of voting might have a more serious effect on the result of the election 
than might any direct mathematical consequence of the failure of the properties. 
STV also has Properties (3) and (4) (Property (4) because if X or Y is excluded 
then the other has more than half the votes and so must be elected), and so it 
follows from the Theorem that STV must violate Property (1). An illustration of 
this is given by Carstairs [2, p. 38]. There are three candidates, one of whom is to 
be elected. In two different elections the ballots are as in Table 2. In the first 
election, Z is excluded and X elected. In the second election, X gains two 
first-preference votes at the expense of Y; Y is therefore excluded and Z is 
elected, not X. 
Table 2 
Ex. 1 Ex. 2 
X 8 10 
YZ 8 6 
ZX 7 7 
This is certainly unfortunate. In defence of STV it may be said that the method 
is simple (an important requirement in practice); that the failure of Property (1) is 
too unpredictable to encourage 'tactical voting'; and that if (as the supporters of 
STV would undoubtedly claim) the violations of Property (1) only arise with sets 
of voting figures that are far removed from those that one would expect o meet 
in practice, then perhaps no great harm is done. This does not mean that there is 
no point in looking for a better system; in particular, it might be possible to find 
some better criterion for exclusions than always to exclude the candidate with 
fewest votes. But the theorem shows that anomalies cannot be avoided 
altogether. 
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